
Indemnity costs have been ordered against Mitchell Winehouse, suing as personal representative of his late daughter Amy Winehouse's estate, after his High Court claim over 141 disputed items of property was dismissed in full and his conduct of the litigation found "unreasonable to a high degree."
In a 29 July 2026 ruling, the High Court ordered him to pay both defendants' costs on the indemnity — not standard — basis, with no reduction, and to make immediate six-figure interim payments with no stay pending appeal. Winehouse v Parry & Gourlay ([2026] EWHC 1970 (KB)) shows exactly how much a claim's cost exposure can grow once a court decides it was pursued unreasonably, and exactly when that risk becomes unavoidable.
In short: a court will order indemnity costs — a more generous, claimant-unfriendly basis of recovery — where a losing party's conduct of a case, not just its merits, is found unreasonable to a high degree; here, that meant unproven allegations of dishonesty, late-stage amendments, and pursuit of a claim the court found irreconcilable with the claimant's own documents. The practical result was two immediate six-figure payment obligations, undiscounted, with no stay pending appeal.
Mitchell Winehouse brought a claim against Naomi Parry and Catriona Gourlay, two women closely connected to Amy Winehouse, alleging they were not entitled to possess or sell 141 items that had been auctioned at Julien's Auctions in 2021 and 2023. Following a six-day trial, the court's substantive judgment, handed down in April 2026, dismissed every one of the claimant's claims. This second judgment resolves the separate, hard-fought dispute over who pays for that litigation, and how much.
The costs judgment records that the parties could not agree any aspect of costs following trial, prompting extensive written submissions, response submissions and roughly 500 pages of supporting evidence from each side. The defendants argued the claimant's defeat was total and that his conduct — including allegations of theft, deliberate concealment and breach of fiduciary duty — was unreasonable to a high degree. The claimant argued the opposite: that the defendants' own conduct, particularly their delay in explaining their possession of the items and their reluctance to mediate, justified no order for costs at all, or at minimum a 75% reduction.
The judge, Sarah Clarke KC, rejected the claimant's position in full. She found the claim had been "speculative, weak, opportunistic and thin," that the claimant and his witnesses had been disbelieved on oath, and that the claimant knew — from contemporaneous documents in his own possession — that the defendants' intention to sell the items had never been concealed from him.
Costs in English civil litigation are governed by CPR r44.2, which starts from the general rule that the unsuccessful party pays the successful party's costs, subject to the court's wide discretion to depart from that rule based on conduct. Indemnity costs — a materially more generous basis of recovery for the winning side — require something that takes the case "out of the norm," a test drawn from Excelsior Commercial and Industrial Holdings and refined in Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England. The bar is unreasonableness, not dishonesty or moral blame, though the Court of Appeal's more recent guidance in Thakkar v Mican [2024] EWCA Civ 552 confirms that a failed allegation of dishonesty will "very often" tip a case into indemnity territory.
Where the exposure actually starts. The judgment is a reminder that costs risk does not begin at trial — it begins the moment a party puts a serious, unproven allegation of dishonesty on the record. Once such an allegation is pleaded and pursued to judgment without success, the paying party has effectively pre-loaded the costs consequences of losing, regardless of how the underlying claim was otherwise conducted.
The point at which this dispute moved from ordinary litigation risk to acute financial exposure was identifiable and specific: the late amendments adding allegations of deliberate concealment and breach of fiduciary duty, made only months before trial. The judge found these amendments significantly expanded the evidence, the length of the six-day trial (which overran a listed three-day estimate), and, crucially, the scope of costs that would later need to be justified. That is the moment monitoring should have given way to action — a serious reassessment of whether to maintain or withdraw allegations once the documentary record undermined them.
The escalation point in practice. Once late-stage allegations of dishonesty are added to a claim already resting on a thin evidential base, the receiving party's costs recovery — and the paying party's liability — escalate together; both sides' budgets are displaced, and the eventual costs order tends to track the seriousness of the allegations rather than the value of the underlying dispute.
The financial consequences were immediate and substantial. The claimant was ordered to pay interim costs on account of £569,330.99 to the first defendant and £394,521.89 to the second defendant, both within 14 days, with no stay pending any application for permission to appeal. The court calculated these figures using 90% of each defendant's budgeted costs and 75% of unbudgeted costs, reflecting its view that the defendants were highly likely to recover most of what they claimed on detailed assessment. The claimant's own costs, by contrast, were noted to exceed £950,000 against a budget of roughly £160,000 — an overspend the judge attributed largely to his own conduct of the litigation.
Interim payment as immediate exposure. An interim payment on account under CPR r44.2(8) converts a costs order from a future accounting exercise into an immediate cash liability; where a court also declines to stay that payment pending appeal, as happened here, the paying party must fund the award before any appellate review of the underlying decision.
For organisations and individuals contemplating litigation involving allegations of impropriety, this judgment underscores several recurring lessons: allegations of dishonesty carry asymmetric costs risk if unproven; failing to engage candidly with a well-evidenced defence increases the odds a court will treat pursuit of the claim as unreasonable; and expanding a claim shortly before trial, rather than narrowing it, is likely to be read by the court as evidence of an inherently weak case being propped up.
The broader pattern. Courts are increasingly treating late-stage escalation of unproven misconduct allegations — particularly where contemporaneous documents already available to the claimant contradict the claim — as a marker of unreasonableness sufficient to justify indemnity costs, independent of whether the claim also fails on its substantive merits.
Estate and probate disputes involving high-profile figures often attract public attention, and this judgment shows a court willing to factor reputational harm from public allegations into its assessment of a claimant's conduct, separate from the merits of the underlying property claim. It is a useful marker for practitioners advising clients on the risks of combining litigation with media engagement.
The costs recoverable by both defendants remain subject to detailed assessment if not agreed between the parties. The judgment also records that the claimant's application for permission to appeal was refused by the trial judge, with consequential directions given for any renewed application to the Court of Appeal.
